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Tschider: Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health Marketplace

Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health
Marketplace
Charlotte A. Tschider*
'Tis your own safety that is at stake, when your neighbour-s wall is in
flarmes, and fires neglected are wont to gather strength._

-

Horace

INTRODUCTION

The global digital health market has grown exponentially in the past five
years, fueled by Internet of Things (loT) development increased mobile
device adoption, and Big Data investment.2 Historically, the medical device
industry focused on device implants and direct therapies, but future medical
technologies also leverage network connectivity and data aggregation,
necessitating comprehensive cybersecurity activities to protect consumers. 3
Market leaders in digital health have recently invested heavily in
technologies that simultaneously improve patient connectedness and
convenience, yet increase the probability of cybersecurity threats
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1. Q. HORATIUS FLACCUs, EPISTULAE, Bk. 1, Ep. 8 in HORACE: SATIRES, EPISTLES AND
ARS POETICA (H. RUSHTON FAIRCLOUGH, ED.TRANs., HARVARD UNIV. PRESS REV. ED. 1929) (c.

35 B.C.E.), http://www.archive.org/stream/satiresepistlesa00horauoft/satiresepistlesaOOhora
uoftdjvu.txt.
2. Bill Chamberlin & Ed Gretz, Internet of Things: Sall loT Projects Pay the Way for
Future Transforation, BLUEMINE: HORIZONWATCH (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.slideshare.
net/HorizonWatching/internet-of-things-trends-to-watch-in-2016; see also Valerie Jennings,
Denver and Kansas City-Based Custom Software Development Firm Twentyseven Global,
Discusses Digital Health Industry Developments, TWENTYSEVEN GLOBAL (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.27global.com/denver-and-kansas-city-based-custom-software-developmentfi rm-twentyseven-gl obal-discusses-digital-health-i ndustry-developments/.
3. Mathias Cousin, Tadashi Castillo-Hi, & Glenn Snyder, Devices and Diseases: Howthe
loT is Transforing Medtech, DELOITTE UNIV. PRESS (Sept. 11, 2015), http://dupress.com
articIes/internet-of-things-iot-in-medical-devices-industry/.
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compromising system vulnerabilities.4 While digital health technologies
offer several benefits to patients and healthcare providers, connected
technologies attract new threats, potentially resulting in both health data loss
and compromise of patient physical safety.s The combination of technology
connectivity with increasingly common third party involvement via the
cloud, Software as a Service (SaaS), and big data, multiplies the probability
of harm, due to the presence of high-vol ume data sets for multiple customers,
often connected over the public Internet or home networks with unknown
settings.6
The cybersecurity community, and increasingly, federal agencies, have
recognized the inherent risks of connected devices both broadly within the
loT and for wirelessly connected medical devices.' In 2012, as both the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) was developing its Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) audit methodology and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was developing cybersecurity guidelines,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) called on the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to develop a plan to address medical device
security risk.'
4. Sonali P. Gunawardhana, The Impact of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities on Mobile
Medical App Development, MED. DEVICE ONLINE (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.rreddevice
online.com'doc/the-im-pact-of-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities-on-rmobile-medical-applications0001.
5. CGI, CYBERPRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY FOR HEALTH DATA 1 (2015), https:/ANww.
cgi.com'sites/default/fi les/white-papers/cgi-cybersecurity-for-health-data-white-paper.pdf.
6. See generally Kimberly Crossland, 5 Big Privacy Problems that Come with Big Data,
TECHOPEDIA (an. 29, 2014), https://www.techopedia.con-2/29682/trends/big-data/5-bigprivacy-problems-that-come-with-big-data; see also Colin Wood, The Irmportance of
Cybersecurity in the Age of the Cloud and Internet of Things, Gov -TTECH. (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.govtech.comfsecurity/The-Im-portance-of-Cybersecurity-in-the-Age-of-theCloud-and-Internet-of-Things.html (explaining that Software as a Service, or SaaS, is a cloud
service involving access to a Web-based application); see also Understanding the Cloud
Computing Stack: SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, RACKSPACE (2016), https://support.rackspace.com'
white-paper/understandi ng-the-cloud-comrputi ng-stack-saas-paas-i aas/ (juxtaposing
the
methodology and applicability of cloud services SaaS, Platform as a Service (PaaS), and
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)).
7. See generally Gib Sorebo, Managing the Unanageable: A Risk Model for the Internet
of Things, RSA CONF. 2015 (Apr. 2015), https://www.rsaconference.con-writable/pre
sentations/file_upload/grc-rOl-managing-the-unrmnageable-a-risk-model-or-the-internet-ofthings.pdf; see U.S. FED. TRADE COMM N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 10 (an.
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/systemfiles/documents/reports/
federal-trade-comni ssi on-staff-report-november-201 3-workshop-entitled-internet-thingsprivacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC]; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR
DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MED.
DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY

40an. 22, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/

medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocurrents/ucm482022.pdf
(addressing the risks of data compromise inherent in redical device rermediation).

8.
FDA

See generally U.S.

Gov-T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO-12-816,

MEDICAL DEVICES:

SHOULD EXPAND ITS CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF
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Since 2012, much has changed. Developments in consumer-facing loT
technologies combined with organizational foci on medical cost reduction
and value-based health care have driven development of medical device
applications and equipment that are network-aware.9 Although an Internet
connection alone does not increase risk criticality, network-aware devices
dramatically increase exposure to a wide variety of globally dispersed threat
vectors.10 Largely because of the highly complex and multi-faceted nature of
cybersecurity risk, the digital health regulatory landscape has become equally
complex and, in some respects, incomplete for organizations not subject to
HIPAA."1
This paper aims to dem-tystify the science of cybersecurity and propose a
common-sense approach to improve clarity for organizations developing
medical device productsfor the digital health industry. In Part I, this Author
describes the existing context for regulatory activity and the conditions
precipitating increased risk. Part II describes in detail duplicative and
frequently incomplete coverage within the existing regulatory framework
regulated by the FDA and the OCR. In Part III, this Author proposes an
adapted FDA regulatory framework to simplify and clarify regulation of the
digital health marketplace.
PART I: SIGNIFICANT DIGITAL HEALTH GROWTH, CYBERSECURITY RISK

The United States spends nearly eighteen percent of its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on healthcare each year, which is expected to rise to 20.1
percent by 2025.12 Organizations investing in digital health have forecasted

(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647767.pdf.
John Glaser, How the Internet of Things Will Affect Health Care, Hosp. & HEALTH
NETWORKS (June 4, 2015), http://www.hhnmag.comarticles/3438-how-the-internet-ofthings-will-affect-health-care.
10. Networked Medical Devices: Security and Privacy Threats, SYMANTEC 7 (2011),
https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white-papers/bnetworked_ medicaldevicesWP_21177186.en-us.pdf; see Cybersecurity of NetworkConnected Medical Devices in the Netherlands, DELOITTE 1 (2015), http://www2.deloitte.
com/content/dam/Deloitternl/Docum-ents/public-sector/deloitte-nl-risk-cybersecurity-ofnetwork-connected- medical-devices-in-the-netherlands.pdf (A 'threat vector_ is a
combination of a threat or a person or event causing an impact to data confidentiality,
integrity, or availability; with the steps used to leverage vulnerabilities and comproise a
target, such as using a malicious file, SQL injection, or other method for gaining access to, or
owning, a system).
11. U.S. DEP-T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY
SECURITY OF HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY HIPAA 29 ( uly 17,
2016), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/fiIes/non-coveredentities-report-june_17_201
DEVICES

&

9.

6.pdf.
12. NHE Fact Sheet,

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.

(Aug. 10, 2016),

https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-andreports/national heal thexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet. html.
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significant growth potential in digital health technologies, with venture
capital firms investing $4.5 billion in 2015 and healthcare providers netting
a projected $305 billion in savings from $32.4 billion spent on digital health
investments.13 Research firms approximate the health app market alone to
reach $26 million.14 Technology developments and increased pressure to
develop low-cost care solutions have incentivized organizations to develop
connected digital health products." With sixty-four percent of American
adults using mobile devices, the options for delivering health care or
improving health overall have spurred significant growth in the digital health
industry. 16 By September 2015, organizations had released 165,000 mobile
health apps, with twenty-two percent related to medication reminders and
information, women-s health and pregnancy, and disease-specific
treatment. 17
A. Digital Health Technology
Although not defined in statute, 'digital health, _ as adopted by the F DA,
includes mobile health ('mHealth_), health information technology (IT),
wearable devices, telehealth, telemedicine, and personalized medicine.1 By

13. Theresa
HEALTH (2015),
(last visited Oct.
2014); see also

Wang et al., Digital Health Funding: 2015 Year in Review, ROCK
https://rockhealth.comreports/digital-health-funding-2015-year-in-review
13, 2016) (Venture funding had increased 115 percent between 2013 and
Corey Stern, Goldmn Sachs Says a Digital Healthcare Revolution is

Coning' and it Could Save Arerica $300 billion,

BUSINESS INSIDER

(Jun. 29, 2015),

http://www.businessinsider.comgoldman-digital-healthcare-is-coming-2015-6 (summarizing
the projection reports of digital health savings); see also Michael D. Beauvais et al., Digital
Health Pulse: Regulatory and Transactional Developments, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 16, 2016),
http://www.lexology.com/ibrary/detail.aspx?g=b22306c3-b081-4046-86e7-3e2f64d0427d
(anticipating a unique regulatory framework for digital health oversight).
14.
MIT TECH. REV., Mobile Medical Apps: A Market on the Move (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.technologyreview.comns/532661/rmobile-medical-apps-a-market-on-the-move/
Research activity also predicts future investment see, e.g., John E. Ferguson & A. David
Redish, Wireless Comrmunication with Implanted Medical Devices Using the Conductive
Properties of the Body, 8 EXPERT REV. MED. DEVICES 427, 433 (Jul. 2011); see also Ashraf
Darwish & Aboul Ella Hassanien, Wearable and Irmplantable Wireless Sensor Network
Solutions for Healthcare Monitoring, 11 SENSORS 5561, 5562 (2011) (describing one such
digital health investment in wireless sensor network technologies).
15. Accelerating the Adoption of Connected Health, DELOITTE 2(2015), http://www2.del
oitte.comfcontent/dam/D el oitte/us/D ocurments/ i fe-sciences-heal th-care/us-dchs-connected-

health.pdf.
16.

Aaron Smith, Chapter One: A Portrait of Srmrtphone Ownership, PEw RESEARCH
2 (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/chapter-one-a-portrait-ofsrmartphone-ownershi p/.
17. Patient Adoption of mi-iealth, IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICs 4 (Sept.
2015), http://www.imshealth.con/files/web/IMSH0%20Institute/Reports/Patient/o2OAdoption
%20of%2OmHealth/IIHIPatientAdoption of mHealth.pdf (discussing that disease-specific
apps constituted nine percent of all apps, or 14,850 apps in total).
18. Digital Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
CTR.
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means of example, sensor technologies, which physicians use for avariety of
purposes in medical care, have the opportunity to be implanted and connected
to external devices, improving real time monitoring as a patient continues in
her daily life." In order to remotely monitor patients, sensors transfer a large
volume of health data and identifiable health information via the open Web,
potentially increasing the data s exposure to misuse.20
It is critical to understand which technologies the digital health
marketplace includes in order to determine appropriate recommendations for
protecting patients and consumers. Practically speaking, digital health
medical devices can be grouped by technological characteristics and type of
implementation (See Table 1).21 Implanted devices may be network-aware or
not, such as an implanted device that is controlled remotely or continuously
sends health data to another system versus a device that is cal i brated prior to
implantation. 22 Implanted devices can also include manufacturer-operated
applications (such as a mobile app or a Web-based app) and data storage
(such as a database).23
Non-implanted devices, by contrast, may aid in performing a medical
procedure or diagnostics, but do not pervasively interact with the body. Nonimplanted devices may include only the device used to perform a procedure,
or devices can be connected to an information system that contains software
to collect personal information about a patient and the procedure.24 Devices
with software can be configured as network-aware and may transfer data to
a hospital data center or to a manufacturers data center or cloud provider.25
Wearables receive information from an individual and provide

Digital Health/default.htm (last updated Aug. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Digital Health].
19. Ashraf Darwish, The Irmpact of Implantable Sensors in Medical Applications, 2
AUSTIN J. BIOSENSORS & BIOELECTRONICS 1016, 1016 (2016), http://austinpublishinggroup.
com/biosensors-bioelectronics/download.php?file=fulltext/ajbb-v2-idl016.pdf.
20. Gunawardhana, supra note 4 (explaining that when data is exposed to the Internet
absent cybersecurity controls, outside parties could change data, resulting in inaccurate
treatment or hackers could steal data, such as identifiable personal information, and use it for
healthcare fraud).
21. See generally Digital Health, supra note 18.
22. Cybersecurity for Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: FDA Safety
Cormmunication, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/
AlertsandNotices/ucm356423.htm(last updated Oct. 9, 2014).
23. E.T. van der Velde et al., Integration of Data from Remote Monitoring Systems and
Programmers into the Hospital Electronic Health Record System Based on International

Standards, 20 NETH.

HEARTJ.

66, 68(Jan. 10, 2012).

24.

CLAUDIO BECCHETTI & ALESSANDRO NERI, MEDICAL INSTRUMENT DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT: FROM REQUIREMENTS TO MARKET PLACEMENTS 20(2013), http://rmedia.wiley.

com/product-data/excerpt/09/11199524/1119952409-31.pdf.
25. MELISA BOCKRATH, MEDICAL DEVICES BEGIN To DRIFT INTO CLOUD, KELLY SERVICES
8 (ebook), http://www.kellyocg.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Knowledge/Ebooks/Medical%
20Devices%20Begin%20to%2ODrift/o20Into%20Cloud.pdf.
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information from a device to a recipient, such as a caregiver or healthcare
provider, but often do not deliver any physiological change to the body (i.e.
cause cardiac muscleto contract).26 Wearables include devices like the Fitbit,
which measures heartrate, exercise, and sleep data, combining information
an individual enters and information gathered simply by being worn.27
Wearables usually connect to an external mobile device via a wireless
network or other communication protocol like Bluetooth to transmit data to
a mobile application, an 'app. _28 Mobile apps can receive data from an
implanted device, non-implanted device, or wearable, and can store data
either on the device (thick client) or immediately send data to another
location (thin client).29 Sinilar to mobile devices, organizations often design
Web applications to facilitate medical consultations (telehealth or remote
doctor visits), gather personal information, or provide treatment
recomrnendati ons based on information gathered from an online Web forn. 0
Finally, general administrative IT software or Web applications provide
support to health-related operations. 1 This night include scheduling
software, time reporting and HR management, patient intake, or overall
storage of medical records.3 2
Although all devices could pose some risk to patients or consumers,
devices with the highest inherent risk of harm include implanted or affixed
devices." Thee devices may directly deliver medication or other stimulus to
the human body or gather biological health information directly.' When
combined with wearables, mobile apps, or Web applications that are exposed
26. Tyler Hayes, What-s Inside a Fitness Tracker, Anyway?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov.
29, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.comwearables/whats-inside-fitness-trackeany
way/.
27. Heather Landi, Health Systems Collaborating with Fitbit to Use Connected Health

Technologies for Research and Patient Engagement,

HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS

(July 29,

2016), http://www.healthcare-inforrmtics.comnews-itempatient-engagement/health-system
s-col laborati ng-fitbit-use-connected-health-technologies.
28. See generally FTC, supra note 7.
29. Id.; see Vangie Beal, The Differences Between Thick, Thin & Smrt Clients,
WEBOPEDIA UJuly 14, 2006), http://www.webopedia.comDidY ouKnow/HardwareSoftware/
thi ncl ient-applications.asp (distinguishing between thick and thin client applications and
users).
30. See NAT-L RESEARCH COUNCIL, U.S. COMM. ON ENHANCING THE INTERNET FOR
HEALTH APPLICATIONS, NETWORKING HEALTH: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE INTERNET 194-95
(2000), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44714/.
31. The 20 Most Popular E MR Software Solutions, CAPTERRA, http://www.capterra.com'
infographics/top-emr-software (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
32. Top Electronic Medical Records (EMR) Software Products, CAPTERRA, http://www.
capterra.com/electronic-rredical-records-software/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
33. Food and Drug Adninistration Safety and Innovation Act f 618, infra 124; GENERAL
WELLNESS,

infra 144.

34. Implants and Prosthetics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
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to the open Internet, the potential risks of physical injury or substantial data
loss increase. 5 For these reasons, the FDA publicly announced both in 2015
and 2016 its intention to focus attention on high risk digital health medical
devices, rather than all health-related mobile apps.16
B. Cybersecurity Risks - Threats and Vulnerabilities for Digital Health
Products
Cybersecurity is defined as 'the activity or process, ability or capability,
or state whereby information and communications systems and the
information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against
damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation._ The breadth of
this definition is critical to understanding cybersecurity: not only do strong
cybersecurity practices require technical solutions, but they also require
strong organizational processes and continuous management.3 In the
cybersecurity field, both administrative controls, controls like processes and
procedures regulating human behavior, and technical controls, or controls
managed via computerized mechanisms, must be implemented in a complete
cybersecurity program 3 Much like medical device regulation and safety
assessments, cybersecurity is, at its foundation, a creature of risk
management. 40
The cybersecurity field aims to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information. 4 1 For digital health, this means examining how a
loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might result in risks to a
patient or consumer for a particular type of device, ultimately causing an
either physical or financial injury.42 Understanding the risks for a specific
35.

Williams & Woodward, infra note 136, at307.
MOBILE MEDICAL, infra note 143; GENERAL WELLNESS, infra note 144.
37. Cybersecurity: A Beginners Vocabulary, CYBERSECURITYU, http://www.cyber
securityu.org/cybersecurity-a-beginners-vocabulary/(lastvisited Nov. 16, 2016).
38. A common example in cybersecurity is the practice of access management. Access
management practices involve processes like access reviews, where user accounts are
reviewed periodically to ensure individuals who have moved to a new role or have been

36.

terminated no longer haveaccesstosystems and information. SeeTHE FIN.INDUs. REG.AUTH.,
REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 19 (Feb. 2015), http:/ANww.finra.org/sites/default/

files/p602363%20Report 0/20on%2OCybersecurity%2OPractices_0.pdf.
39. Stephen Northcutt, Security Controls, SANS TECH. INST., http://www.sans.edu/
research/security-laboratory/article/security-controls (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
40. See generally THE N.Z. NATL CYBER SECURITY CTR., CYBER SECURITY AND RISK
MANAGEMENT: AN EXECUTIVE LEVEL RESPONSIBILITY (2013), http://www.ncsc.govt.nz/
assets/cyber-security-risk- management-Executive.pdf.

41.

Dan Craigen et al., Defining Cybersecurity,

TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV.

13, 15

(Oct. 2014) (citing Public Safety Canada 2014).
42. Peter Sullivan etal., In Cybersecurity, No Harm Does Not Necessarily Mean No Foul,
L. 360 (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.law360.comarticles/759413/in-cybersecurity-no-harmdoes-not-necessarily-mean-no-foul.
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type of device is a critical step in effective cybersecurity because certain
threats exploit different types of devices, and loT devices, increasingly used
as medical devices, already have significant vulnerabilities.43
The digital health marketplace provides almost unlimited opportunities for
sensitive data exposure and financial gain for malicious actors.4 Health data
has become the most Iucrative data type for sale on the black market netting
$10 per record; 45 fifty percent of identity theft events involve medical data,
and health data is compromised in forty-four percent of data breaches.46
Hackers and other malicious actors use health data to file tax returns, file
false medical claims against insurance, or receive other benefits, such as free
prescriptions.4 7 In 2014, a new record was reached with one billion personal
information records compromised in one year; in 2015, Anthem, Inc.
reported a cybersecurity data breach impacting eighty million health
insurance customers, the largest breach to date involving health
information.' Opportunities for system compromise and the value of

43. Ericka Chickowski, Internet of Things Contains Average of 25 Vulnerabilities Per
Device, DARK READING (July 29, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://www.darkreading.comf
vulnerabilities' -threatsi nternet-of-thi ngs-contai ns-average-of-25-vul nerabi I ties-perdevice/d/d-id/1297623; TJ McCue, $117 Billion Market For Internet of Things In Healthcare
By 2020, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://www.forbes.comsites/tjmccue/
201 5/04/22/117-bill ion-market-for-i nternet-of-things-i n-healthcare-by-2020/#6e0c5af82471.
44. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. DIRECTORATE FOR Scl., TECH. & INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL ECON. POLY, MANAGING DIGITAL SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK 13
15 (2016). Malicious actors can be internal or external to a company, from state-sponsored
hacking to individually motivated individuals. The range of malicious actors can be large, and
with health information netting top dollar on the black market the variety of malicious actors
is quite large. See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HACKING HEALTHCARE IT IN
20161, 8-22 an. 2016), http:/ icitech.org/wp-content/upl oads/201 6/01 /ICIT- Brief- HackingHealthcare-IT-in-2016.pdf (describing threats manifesting from malicious actors of various
types).
45. Compare Candid Wueest, Underground Black Market: Thriving Trade in Stolen Data,
Malware, and Attack Services, SYMANTEC (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.symantec.com/
connect/bl ogs/underground-bl ack- market-thrivi ng-trade-stol en-data- mal ware-and-attackservices (noting stolen email accounts go for $.10 to $10 per 1000 emails and stolen credit
card information costs between $.10 and $20), with Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your
Medical Record Is Worth More to Hackers than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014,
2:24 PM), http://www.reuters.comarticle/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCNOHJ21I2014
0924 (stating stolen health credentials can amount to $10 per record, ten to twenty times the
value of a stolen credit card number).
46. Kristen Fischer, The7 Biggest Health Data Breaches in the US (So Far), HEALTHLINE
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/seven-biggest-health-data-breaches092814; Humer & Finkle, supra note45.
47. See Fischer, supra note 46 (describing the ways hackers use health data).

48.

1 Billion Data Records Comrprorrised In Data Breaches,

HELP NET SECURITY

(Feb.

16, 2015), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2015/02/16/1-billion-data-records-com-prorrised
-in-data-breaches/ ElizabethWeise, Massive Breach at Health Care Company atAnthemlnc.,
USATODAY (Feb. 5, 2015, 9:26 AM), http://www.usatoday.comstory/tech/2015/02/04/
health-care-anthem-hacked/22900925/.
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personal information continue to incentivize criminal activities.
Although identifiable health information has special value on the open
market, digital health cybersecurity deserves enhanced scrutiny due to the
multi-dimensional nature of digital health threats.4 9 The digital health
marketplace includes countless networked endpoints exposed to threats via
the open Web; hardware that monitors, explores, or alters the human body;
and highly sensitive biological, medical, and other health information.5 0
Furthermore, efforts to improve convenience of treatment often involve
consumer mobile devices and home networks with unknown security
controls.s"

Security vulnerabilities have been identified since 1988, when the Morris
worm crashed thousands of machi nes causing ni lions of dollars in damage. 52
Since 1988, hackers have increasingly exploited system vulnerabilities
affecting millions of systems and devices using various attack types.
However, it took twenty years before researchers hacked the first medical
devices, hacking a pacemaker in 2008.7 Since that time, hacks have
progressed to include insulin pumps and other devices.5 In 2014, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FBI, and the FDA began
issuing security alerts of known medical devicevulnerabilities, and in 2015,
hackers began using medical devicesasan entry point onto hospital networks
to access patient data by hacking Hospira-s PCA infusion drug pumps.s 6 So
49. 2016 Threats Predictions, McAFEE LABS 14, 33-34 (2016), http://www.mcafee.com'
us/resources/reports/rp-threats-predictions-2016.pdf.
50. Barbara L. Filkins et al., Privacy and Security in the Era of Digital Health: What
should Translational Researchers Know and Do about it?, 8 AM.J. TRANSL. RES. 1560, 1564
(2016).
51. Pardeep Kumar & Hoon-Jae Lee, Security Issues in Healthcare Applications Using
Wireless Medical Sensor Networks: A Survey, 12 SENSORs 55, 59 (2012) (discussing how
transmitting wirelessly, which is included in many sensor technologies, can be subject to
eavesdropping during data transmission from devicethrough a network to a recipient).
52. Craig Timberg, Net of Insecurity, WASH. POST (May 30, 2015), http://www.
washi ngtonpost.com/sf/busi ness/2015/05/30/net-of-i nsecurity-part-1 / (explaining how the
Morris worm used the openness of the Internet to quickly spread malicious codes that crashed
thousands of machines, exploiting a security flaw believed to be corrected).
53. See TaylorA rmerrding, The 15 Worst Data Security Breaches of the 21 s Century, CSO
ONLINE (Feb. 15, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/dataprotection/data-protection-the-1 5-worst-data-security-breaches-of-the-21 stcentury.htnl?page=2 (documenting major security breaches of the 21st century).
54. Medical Device Security, SYMANTEC 1 (2016), https://www.symantec.com/content/
dam'symantec/docs/data-sheets/symc-med-device-security-en.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.; Chris Brook, Vulnerability-Riddled Drug Pumps Open to Takeover, THREATPOST
(May 5, 2015, 2:34 PM), https://threatpost.com/vulnerabiIity-riddled-drug-pumps-open-totakeover/112629/; Michael Mezher, Cybersecurity Researcher: Recent Device Vulnerabilities
Should Be a Wake-Up Call to FDA, REG. AFF. PROFS. SoC-Y (Apr. 5, 2016), http://raps.org/
R egulatory-Focus/News/2016/04/05/24704/Cybersecurity-R esearcher- Recent- DeviceVulnerabilities-Should-Be-a-Wake-Up-Call-for-FDA/.
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far in 2016, organizations like CareFusion have responded more
productively, actively owning and driving remediation of research-identified
vulnerabilities." Despite improved organizational awareness to medical
device vulnerabilities, organizations have resisted proactive vulnerability
disclosure and risk management."
Taken together, the presence of a vari ety of new digital health technologies
against a backdrop of lucrative health data sales on the black market appears
to have created an ideal scenario for data exposure and increasingly exploited
vulnerabilities.9 In lieu of market-driven improvements in cybersecurity for
the digital health marketplace, regulatory schemes could effectively drive
cybersecurity improvements.? The HIPAA and the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) with associated regulatory activity from the OCR and
the FDA could provide appropriate oversight for digital health cybersecurity
i mprovements.
PART II: CY BERSECURITY REGULATORY ACTIVITY

A. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services- (H HS) OCR actively
drives privacy and cybersecurity requirements in the digital health market for
entities subject to HIPAA. 61 HIPAA, updated in 2003, and the Health
Information Technology Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,
passed in 2009, establish a compliance framework for a limited subset of
digital health providers: Covered E nti ties (CE) and corresponding B usi ness
Associates (BA). 62

57. See Mezher, supra note 56 (explaining that researchers found 1418 vulnerabilities in
onetool, the Pyxis SupplyStation, and half of which are considered 'high severity according
to commonly accepted Common Vulnerability Scoring System('CV SS ) ranking); see NVD

Cormon Vulnerability Scoring System Support v2,

NATL INST. STANDARDS

& TECH. (Aug.

25, 2016), https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm(explaining that CV SS is a standard measuring system
used to determine vulnerability impact scores and is used by public and private enterprises).
58. Mezher, supra note 56.
59. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (discussing the financial incentives for
hackers to capitalize on the security vulnerabilities in the digital health marketplace).
60. See, e.g., Health Privacy: HIPAA Basics, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb.
1, 2015), https://www.privacyrights.org/content/health-privacy-hipaa-basics#coveredentities
[hereinafter HIPAA Basics].
61. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), P.L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1938 (1996); HIPAA Basics, supra note 60.
62. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 45 C.F.R. f
160 etseq. (1996); Health InsuranceTechnology for Economic and Clinical Health(HITECH)
Act of 2009,42 U.S.C. f 17921 (2016); 42 U.S.C. f 17934-40(2010); HIPAA Basics, supra
note 60; Vadim Schick, After HITECH: HIPAA Revisions Mandate Stronger Privacy and
Security Safeguards, 37 J.C. & U.L. 403, 408-18 (2011). HITECH-s contributions included
expansion of BA HIPAA compliance responsibilities (including execution of Business
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1. Classification and Applicability
For HIPAA to require organizational compliance, organizational activities
must involve Protected Health Information (PHI), which is information that
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health condition of an
individual.' It can include a wide variety of data elements including name,
address, admission date, birth date, medical record numbers, health plan
beneficiary numbers, age over eighty-nine, IP addresses, biometric
identifiers, and avariety of other elements." Froma data perspective, HIPAA
is broad in application, though limited to specific entities, the CE and the
BA.65

CEs have a primary business relationship with individuals, such as
patients, who disclose PHI to CEs for health services or coverage of health
services.66 Under HIPAA, CEsfall into three categories: health plans, which
typically involve insurance providers or self-insured entities; healthcare
providers, or organizations providing health care to individuals, such as
hospitals, clinics, or research institutions; and healthcare clearinghouses, or
an organization that processes or facilitates the processing of nonstandard
data elements to standard data.' BAs, or organizations that perform a
supportive role for C Es, perform activities involving the use or disclosure of
PHI on behalf of, or to perform services for, a C E.1 Statutory interpretation
clearly illustrates that the categorization of a BA is dependent on the primary
organization-s classification as a CE. If an organization is not a CE or BA
Associate Agreements), limited PHI sale without authorization, required the expanded use of
limited data sets, required data breach notification and reporting requirements, enhanced
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) latitude to conduct periodic audits, and expanded fine amount
and application to business associates.
63. 45 C.F.R. f 160.103 (2013).
64. Id.
65. See HIPAA Basics, supra note 60.
66. OFF. NATL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVs., GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 15
(Apr. 2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/fiIes/pdf/privacy/privacy-and-security-gu

ide.pdf.
67. Id.
68. 45 C.F.R. f 164.502(e), 164.504(e), 164.532(d), 164.532(e) (2013); HIPAA Basics,
supra note 60.
69. 45 C.F.R. f 160.103. The statutory language 'on behalf of_ a CE illustrates a
dependency within HIPAA on CE status. Therefore, if the primary organization receiving
health data directly from an individual does not meet the definition of a CE, third parties
performing activities on behalf of a CE similarly are not considered a BA, and third parties of
a third party are not considered a BA. Ultimately, neither of these organizations, if not
following from CE status, would be required to meet HIPAA or HITECH statutory
requirements. However, BAs must individually and independently comply with HIPAA under
the HITECH updates; somewhat severing a compliance responsibility for CEs of their BAs,
though CEs must still hold BAs accountable to compliance with HIPAA via monitoring
activities. See Health Insurance Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act f 17921
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and a third party is involved, that third party is also not subject to HIPAA. 70
2. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
The HIPAA Privacy Rule enforces the privacy concepts of collection,
notice, consent, and authorization to use or disclose PHI. HIPAA restricts
collection or subsequent use of PHI to the 'minimum necessary. _1 To this
end, CEs must implement policies and practices to reasonably limit PHI
collected, used, or disclosed to only what is necessary for personnel to
perform their] ob duties.72 Even though aCE may have access to a significant
amount of PHI, it may not disclose unrestricted copies of this information to
third parties, except at the direction and authorization of the individual or as
previously communicated and authorized.
HIPAA provides precise requirements of how an individual must receive
notice about a CE -s privacy practices. Individuals must receive a Notice of
Privacy Practices before a CE collects PHI, and be informed that updates to
this notice are distributed every three years or within 60 days of material
changes.74 The Notice of Privacy Practices includes an effective date;
informati on about use, such as thi rd party use and data transfer; what type of
PHI may be collected; identity of the CE; and information about how to file
a complaint.75 T he privacy notice must be provided upon request, posted in
an easily accessible location, written clearly and in an easy to read style,
provided on demand, and the notice must be complete with respect to CE and
BA practices. 6 The individual then consents to the notice by written consent
(electronic or in paper form).7

(providing the definition of breach and its exceptions).
70. 45 C.F.R. f 160.103; Health Insurance Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Actf 17921.
71. 45 C.F.R. f 164.502(b), 164.514(d) (2013).
72. 45 C.F.R. f 164.502(b), 164.514(d).
73. 45 C.F.R. f 164.502(b), 164.514(d). The minimum necessary rule does not apply
when disclosed to a health care provider for treatment, payment for operational purposes, or
to the individual, pursuant to authorization, for Office for Civil Rights (OCR) complaint
investigation, or pursuant to a legal demand; see SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE,
U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs. 4-11, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacy
summary.pdf (last revised May 2003) (explaining the instances when a CE is permitted to use
and disclosures protected health information, the authorization requirements a CE rmust obtain
before any use or disclosure of protected health information, and when the minimum necessary
requirement is not imposed on a CE).
74. 45 C.F.R. f 164.520. The three-year distribution depends on material changes not
being made. If material changes are made to the notice, the notice must be posted and
distributed within 60 days.
75. 45 C.F.R. f 164.520(b).
76. Id.
77. 45 C.F.R. f 164.506, 164.510, 164.512; Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Inforation, U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (July 6, 2001),
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Although CEs must adhere to the minimum necessary requirement when
handling PHI, CEs may use, transfer, or disclose PHI pursuant to individual
authorization.7 When a CE uses an individual -s PHI for purposes beyond the
scope of necessity outlined in the privacy notice, written consent
(authorization) communicating the details of this use is required from the
individual.
3. The HIPAA Security Rule
In contrast to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which relies on standard privacy
principles and clear rules, the H IPAA Security Rule applies risk management
techniques to manage data confidentiality, integrity and availability for
PHI.8 o Risk management techniques typically offer more overall flexibility
for an organization to choose a particular solution to comply with the H IPAA
Security Rule."
The HIPAA Security Rule organizes implementation specifications into
two categories: addressable and required.82 In contrast with a required
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/standards-privacy-individually-identifiable-healthinformation. Individuals can also use electronic signatures. Although the use of electronic
signatures is not definitely prescribed under HIPAA, the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce (E-SIGN) would apply to the Notice of Privacy Practices; see Kathy
Bakich & Kaye Pestaina, Security and Electronic Signature Standards, EMPLOY ER-s GUIDE
To HIPAA PRIVACY REQUIREMENTs 61030 (Kathryn Bakich & Joanne Hustead eds., 2015),
Westlaw (database updated 2016) (explaining that the standard for electronic signatures were
neverfinalized in the security rules).
78. 45 C.F.R. f 164.506.
79. 45 C.F.R. f 164.506, 164.508. CEs must receive authorization before collecting data
beyond the inimum necessary rule. A hallmark of HIPAA, the minimum necessary rule
ensures limitations on abuse of data collection, such as transfer to third parties or gathering of
data not pertinent to the administration of treatment or procurement of other health services
like insurance. HITECH, which amended and updated HIPAA provisions in 2009 explicitly
established that CEs may not sell an individual's PHI without additional authorization. See
Schick, supra note 62, at 408-18. HIT ECH also provided additional enhancements, such as
explicit obligations for BAs to follow HIPAA, a co-extensive responsibility to sign a Business
Associate Agreement (BAA), and authorization for the Office for Civil Rights to audit CEs
and BAs to ensure compliance; see also Howard Anderson, The Essential Guide to HITECH
Act, HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.
com/essenti al-guide-to-hitech-act-a-2053 (summarizing the major data security components
of the HITECH Act).
80. 45 C.F.R. 160, 164; see generally U.S. DEP-T HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., 2 HIPAA
SECURITY SERIEs 3 (2004), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/adri ni
strative/securityrule/securityl0l.pdf (explaining how the Security Rule applies to CEs and
providing assistance with implementation of the security standards).
81. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 80, at 8.
82. 45 C.F.R. f 164.306(d); What is the Difference Between Addressable and Required
Implementation Specifications in the Security Rule?, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2020/what-is-the-difference-betweenaddressable-and- requi red-i mplementati on-specificationsfi ndex. html (last visited Nov. 8,
2016) [hereinafter Addressable and Required Implementation].
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implementation specification, an addressable specification permits a CE or
BA to choose how it satisfies the objective of the requirement.' Satisfying
the objective may include meeting the specification, finding an alternative
solution, or not meeting the specification with additional documented
substantiation.' In all cases, the CE or BA must document its decision."
When determining security measures to include, organizations must evaluate
the size, complexity, and capabilities of the organization; the technical
infrastructure, hardware, and software security capabilities; the costs of
security measures; and the probability and criticality of potential risks to
electronic PHI (ePHI).1 6

The HIPAA Security Rule, which preceded many modern developments
in digital health, requires compliance with a smattering of program-level
specifications, yet does not explicitly require many cybersecurity controls.
Ultimately, twenty-one specifications of thirty-nine relate purely to security
rather than broad IT practices, and of those twenty-one specifications, six
describe high-level identity and access management procedures, four relate
to higher-level risk management specifications, andthree relatetoan incident
response process.87 Although these focus areas are important to protect PHI
from unauthorized disclosure or change and ensure availability of PHI, only
eight specifications in some way describe technical cybersecurity controls,
none of them requi red.?
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Addressable and Required Irmplemrentation, supra note 82.
Id.
Id.
45 C.F.R. f 164.306(b)(2).
For example, HIPAA devotes eight specifications to disaster recovery and business

continuity; four specifications to physical security; three specifications to documentation
requirements; two specifications to media management; one specification to asset
management and one specification to human resources controls. Although these controls
support cybersecurity considerations, they are not typically used to protect an organization and
individuals from cyberattack and are instead information technology functions, broadly
construed in a typical IT organization. It should be noted that the HITECH Act did introduce
compulsory data breach notification requirements. While not discussed here, data breach
notification provides a significant opportunity both for improved oversight and for affected
individuals to protect themselves; see45C.F.R. 164.400-164.414. Incorporating addressable
security specifications, such as encryption using an acceptable key strength and protocol, may
reduce a CE or BA-s obligations for notification, as well; see Breach Notification Rule, U.S.
DEP-T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breachnotification/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
88. The remaining specifications fall into the categories of: session management (1), patch
management (1), network management (1), event management (1), integrity (2), and
encryption (2). These specifications do not consider a substantial amount of cybersecurity
controls necessary to protect data. Although this Author aims to illustrate the insufficiency of
cybersecurity controls against the backdrop of an increasingly complex regulatory scheme
rather than propose changes to HIPAA legislation, it is worth noting that compliance with
HIPAA alone would not likely protect PHI from hackers or other entities seeking to damage
an organization or individual. It is worth revisiting the sufficiency of the Security Rule at some
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In an effort to evolve cybersecurity maturity for CEs and BAs, the OCR
has mapped applicable National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) specificationsto the HIPAA Security Rule, a so-called 'crosswalk. 89
Unfortunately, this mapping and other NIST guidance do not establish
mandatory requirements for CEs or BAs, and many still mistakenly believe
that HIPAA compliance sufficiently protects against cybersecurity risk.'
4. OCR Audit Protocol and Oversight
In 2011 and 2012, the OCR developed, pursuant to new HITECH
responsibilities, an auditframework transitioning HIPAA specifications into
an audit control set and worked with 115 C Es to test the audit process.91 In
2015, the OCR selected and initiated its first candidate pool for audits,
notifying CEs in July of 2016, with planned (at the time of writing)
notification of BAs in the fall of 2016.92 The audit protocol matched HIPAA
statutory requirements and was written similarly to the HIPAA privacy,
security, and data breach notification rules.93
Overall, HIPAA coupled with OCR oversight has set a standard for
organizational privacy and security.' However, the limited application via

point in the near future. See Niam Y araghi, Hackers, Phishers, and Disappearing Thunb
Drives: Lessons Learned from Major Health Care Data Breaches, BROOKINGS CTR. FOR TECH.
INNOVATION 2 (May 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PatientPrivacy504v3.pdf. The use of 'addressable_ and 'required_ within the HIPAA Security rule
was included for purposes of organizational flexibility, enabling organizations to select an
appropriate security requirement based on individual circumstances. Unfortunately,
organizations have often interpreted 'addressable_ as optional. See ADDRESSABLE AND
REQUIRED IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 82; Kerry Shackelford, Top 5 HIPAA Compliance
Gaps to Avoid, LINFORD & Co LLP BLOG (July 15, 2013), http://infordco.com/blog/top-5hipaa-compliance-gaps-to-avoid/.
89. See generally U.S. DEP-T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HIPAA SECURITY RULE
CROSSWALK To NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/nist-csf-to-hipaa-security-rule-crosswalk-02-22-2016-final.pdf (describing
the mappings between the HIPAA Security Rule and NIST specifications).
90. Id. NIST offers helpful mappings between cybersecurity categories and relevant
standards (including International Standards Organization, or ISO, a popular standard;
COBIT, a popular audit standard; NIST standards; and other control sets. NIST has also
created additional documents for assistance in complying with HIPAA); see NATL INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., AN INTRODUCTORY RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE HEALTH
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) SECURITY RULE (2008),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-66rl.pdf.
91. HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Audit Programr U.S. DEPT
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcem
ent/audit/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).
92. Id.
93. Id.; Audit Protocol-Updates April 2016, U.S. DEP-T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/audit/protocol/
(last
visited Oct. 13, 2016).
94. HIPAA Enforcement, U.S. DEP-T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., http://www.hhs.gov/hipa
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narrow statutory entity definitions and lack of comprehensive required
technical security controls illustrate a need for more comprehensive
regulation of the digital health marketplace.
B. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosrretic Act
In contrast to the clear application of HIPAA to limited organizational
entities, the FDA establishes comprehensive medical device process
requirements to ensure safety in the health marketplace for devices subject to
the FDCA. 95 The FDCA establishes a compliance framework for products
considered medical devices under the statute.
1. Applicability
Under the FDCA, a device is defined as:
An instrument, apparatus, implement machine, contrivance, implant...
including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . intended for use
in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease... or intended to affect the structure
or function of the body.96
Coupled with case law interpretation, the FDCA defines medical devices
broadly, including a large variety of devices within the digital health sector.'
Whether a device is considered a medical device depends on multiple
factors.98 Not remarkably, then, medical device manufacturers or sellers must

a/for-professionals/comrpliance-enforcement/ (lastvisited Oct. 13, 2016).
95. See What does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
A boutFDA/fransparency/Basics/ucml94879.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2016) (explaining that
the scope of the FDA s regulatory authority includes jurisdiction over medical devices such
as tongue depressors, heart pacemakers, dental devi ces, surgical implants, and prosthetics).
96. 21 U.S.C. f 321(h) (2009); U.S. v. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d
1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994); JAMES T. O-REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION f 18.2 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that the definition of device now
includes computer software and diagnosis aids, but the device must serve a diagnostic or
therapeutic purposes, 'regardless of whether medi cal treatment will follow _.
97. O-REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 96; see alsoAdam Candeub, Digital Medicine,
the FDA, and the First Amendment, 49 GA. L. REV. 933, 937-38 (2015) (noting the
complexities and impact of broad FDA regulation of medical devices, including the chilling
of innovation. While this Author does not aim to redraw FDA determinations of in-scope
medical devices according to the FDCA here, the lack of suitable alternatives for regulation
of digital health applications, such as partial regulation under HIPAA or general, non-specific
regulation under the FTC does not effectively manage very real patient safety and data privacy
concerns); see generally Gary E. Garmerman, Intended Use and Medical Devices:
Distinguishing Nonmedical 'Devices_ from Medical 'Devices_ under 21 U.S.C. f 32(H), 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 806 (1993) (explaining medical device definitions until 1993).
98. U.S. v. An Article of Device, 731 F.2d 1253, 1261 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
although the intention of manufacturer in labeling is not dispositive, it may give some
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satisfy FDA requirements under the FDCA, in contrast with CEs under
HIPAA.99
Although previously unclear, 100 the FDA recognizes a category of digital
health medical devices involving modern technology: mHealth, IT, wearable
devices, telehealth, telemedicine, and personalized medicine. 101 Digital
health medical devices span panels, which are groupings created by the FDA
to create specific requirements and provide informed oversight by medical
specialization. 102
2. Classification
The FDA classifies devices as Class I, II, or III, and this classification
determines medical device controls, including exemptions.103 From Class I
to III, medical devices are organized from requiring least regulatory oversight
to most, with Class I devi ces requiring only compliance with general controls
in the FDCA. 1 " Classes II and III require a showing of 'performance
standards_ beyond general controls, and the FDA classifies new medical
devices as Class III by default. 10s How the device is used and its connection

indication of the device-s use and that the intention of the seller or manufacturer is just one of
many factors determining status as a medical device).
99. See infra Part III (adding further discussion on proposed responsibilities for digital
health cybersecurity); Compare O-REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 96 (explaining the
definition of medical device), with supra Part II, Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Classification and Applicability (describing parties that largely comply
with HIPAA regulation). Covered Entities, frequently health care providers or recipients of
devices, must comply with HIPAA regulations. In contrast the FDCA regulates manufacturers
and sellers of medical devices. In some circumstances, a Covered Entity may also be a medical
device manufacturer. This may mandate co-compliance with divergent requirements. When
organizations are not subject to both regulations, they may be held to comparatively different
security schemes, despite reasonably similar risk to individuals.
100. See Alex Krouse, IPads, IPhones, Androids, and Srartphones: FDA Regulation of
Mobile Phone Applications as Medical Devices, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 731, 751-52 (2012)
('[M]ethods of defining when software must be regulated as a medical device creates
difficulties with new mHealth companies developing mobile applications. The three FDA
software guidance documents still leave considerable questions as to whether an application
requires regulation and if so, what regulation is necessary.).
101. Device Classification Panels, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jun. 24, 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyY our
Device/ucrm051530.htm [hereinafter Device Classification Panels]; see also Digital Health,
supra note 18.
102. 21 C.F.R. f 868.1-892.6500 (2016); see Device Classification Panels, supra note
101 (identifying the medical device classification panels).
103. Classify Your Medical Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/M edicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandG uidance/Overview/ClassifyY ourDevice/
(last updatedJ uly 29, 2014) [hereinafter Classify Your Medical Device].
104. Paul M. Coltoff etal., Regulation of Medical Devices, 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics
f 26 (2016).
105. Id.; Clinical Reference Lab., Inc. v. Sullivan, 791 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Kan. 1992),
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to sustaining human life (in comparison to diagnostic or therapeutic uses)
determines its final classification. 106
3. Medical Device Market Obligations
If any organization expects to successfully market a medical device in the
United States, the organization must maintain a quality system, a procedural
capability that identifies potential safety issues." Class II and III devices and
Class I devices automated with computer software require implementation of
design controls and process controls within such a quality system.108
Organizations also must evaluate and document suppliers on the basis of their
ability to meet quality controls, including notification to a supplier when its
product or service no longer meets quality controls.109
When an organization prepares to submit a devi ce to the F DA for approval,
organizations may choose to pursue a Q-Submission process.110
Organizations can use this process to formally receive FDA feedback before
submitting a medical device for review in 510(k) or Pre-Market Approval
(PMA) submission.' Q-Submission processes enable an organization to
share information about its device(s) to varying degrees, from an informal
meeting like an Informati onal Meeting, or a more formal Pre-S ubmi ssi on.112
A Pre-Submission notification submission is required when a device is
submitted for the first time or when an organization has changed or modified
aff-d in part rev-d in part on other grounds sub nomn U.S. v. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled
Cases, 21 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1994) in 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics f 26 (2016); see f1
807.81-807.100, infra note 114 (explaining that because Class III devices pose substantial
safety risk to individuals, a PMA is submitted, requiring approval from the FDA).
106. Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 103.
107. 21 C.F.R. f 820.5 (2016) (adding that a quality program involves management
responsibility for: organizational structure, policies and procedures, and training and
awareness; additionally, organizations must provide adequate resources and ensure
management review and planning of the Quality Management System ('QMS _)); see 21
C.F.R. f 820.20, 820.22, 820.25 (2016) (elaborating on quality system requirements
regarding management responsibilities, quality audits, and personnel).
108. 21 C.F.R. f 820.30, 820.70, 820.80, 820.90(2016) (explaining that process controls
include Standard Operating Procedures ('SOPs_) and compliance with specified reference
codes or standards. Devices must also be inspected, tested, or verified prior to acceptance. If
a device is found to be nonconforming, the organization must identify and document the
nonconformance, and mai ntai n procedures for rework).
109. 21 C.F.R. f 820.50 (2016).
110. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REQUESTS FOR FEEDBACK ON MEDICAL DEVICE
SUBMISSIONS: THE PRE-SUBMISSION
ADMINISTRATION STAFF 9 (Feb. 18,

PROGRAM AND

MEETINGS WITH

FOOD AND

DRUG

2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucn311176.pdf.
111. Id. at 11.
112. Id. at 5; Kimberly Piermatteo, THE PRE-SUBMISSION PROGRAM AND MEETINGS WITH
FDA STAFF, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 6, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/fraining/
CDR H Learn/UCM461721.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
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a device to the extent it is not substantially sini ar.113
After any preliminary processes, the FDA requires a 510(k) or PMA
submission for all substantially similar or new Class I, II, or III devices
marketed for sale.1 14 The PMA and 510(k) provide notification from an
organization to the FDA of an offering for sale and include supporting
documentation about the device, such as comparable technology similarities
or differences, whether an organization has conducted a reasonable search of
causes for known problems with devices, and clinical trial results." This
information enables effective FDA investigation and classification. 1 6
21 C.F.R. f1 807.81(a)(1), 807.81(a)(3), 807.87 (2007).
21 C.F.R. f1 807.81-807.100 (2016); Prerarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Howto
M arketY ourDevice/PremarketSubri ssions/PrermrketA pprovalPMA/ucm2007514.htm (last
updated July 8, 2016); see 21 C.F.R. f 814.1 (2014) (describing the scope of premarket
approval of medical devices); Prerarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/M edicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/H owtoM arketY our
Device/PrermarketSubmissions/PrermrketNotification5lOk/ (last updated Sept. 16, 2015)
(explaining that an organization importing a device from an organization that has already filled
out the 510(k) does not need to resubmit a 510(k). For Class II devices, if an exemption applies,
the FDA may not require a 510(k). For devices with Classes III, a Pre-Marketing Approval
('PMA_) generally is required). But see Laura Hagen, Coding for Health: Cybersecurity in
Medical Devices, 28 HEALTH LAW. 25, 26-28 (2016) (explaining that the 510(k) and PMA
processes apply to Class II and Class III devices, respectively; Class I devices typically only
require registration, not premarket submission).
115. Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 103; Hagen, supra note 114 (explaining
substantially similar Class II devices proposed for sale submit a 510(k); substantially similar
devices meeting Class III submit a PMA; and all non-substantially similar, Class II and III
new devices submit a PMA. Class I devices are subject to FDCA general controls but do not
have additional special controls, while Class II devices are subject to FDCA performance
standards); PMA Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/PMAApprovals/de
fault.htm (last updated Jan. 26, 2016) (explaining that the FDA provides 510(k) clearances
after review of disclosed changes to a medical device that is still substantially similar to a
previously approved device. For PMAs, the FDA must approve, question, or reject an
application within 180 days, while the FDA has 30 or 90 days to clear, question, or reject a
510(k)); Jason Smith & Stephen Barrett, What are 510(k) Clearance and Prerarket
Approval?, DEVICE WATCH (Apr. 12, 2008), http://www.devicewatch.org/reg/510k.shtml; see
Prerarket Approval, supra note 114 (giving an overview of premarket approval); seeTamsen
Valoir & LindaJ. Paradiso, Patent Strategy for Medical Devices, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L. J. 8, 8 (2011), http://www.boulwarevaloir.com/fda-paper.pdf (discussing the basics of the
FDA and issues in designing patent strategies that adhere to FDA rules).
116. 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/51OkClearances/
(last updatedJ an. 26, 2016); Prerarket Notification Class III Certification and Sumrry, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
HowtoMarketY ourDevice/PrermarketSubmissions/PrermarketNotification510k/ucml42662.ht
m (last updated May 19, 2015) (indicating the alternative to a 501(k) is the Investigational
Device Exception, where organizations submit documentation to register a device for a clinical
study, in comparison to offering a device for sale); see 21 C.F.R. f 812.1 (2016) (identifying
the scope of the investigational device exemptions); Device Advice: Investigational Device
Exception (IDE), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
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Although Class I devices must meet the FDCA standards, they receive
neither clearance nor approval through a formal process and only require
registration of the organization and the device."' Medical mobile
applications, a significant proportion of the future digital health marketplace,
may require even less scrutiny: the FDA has communicated that many
medical mobile applications will not be subj ect to regulatory requirements,
including premarket submissions or quality measures, at this time. 11 If the
FDA determines it will regulate a type of device, then an organization-s
obligations do not end after the FDA s review and approval of an
application."' Organizations must report adverse effects for cleared devices,
such as safety issues and recalls. 120 This information enables the FDA to
effectively share such information with consumers. 12 1 Organizations selling
medical devices must report issues using a Medwatch form, including
individual adverse events, device-related deaths, device-related serious
injuries, malfunctions, or reportable events requiring remedial action to
prevent unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health. 122 The
FDA then posts safety communications, recalls, bans, and emergency
situations for the general public on its Website and via email updates. 123
4. Reports and Cybersecurity Guidance
Passed in 2012, the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation
Act (FDASIA) required the FDA, the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (ONC), and the Federal Communications
RegulationandGuidance/H owtoM arketY ourDevice/Investigational DeviceE xemptionID E/
(last updated Sept. 4, 2015).
117. An Overview of the US FDA Regulatory Process for Medical Devices, EMERGO
GROUP (May 5, 2011), http://www.slideshare.net/emergogroup/us-fda-medical-deviceregulatory-approval-process.
118. Examples of Mobile Apps for which the FDA Will Exercise Enforcement Discretion,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/Mobile
MedicalApplications/ucm368744.htm (last updated Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Examples of
Mobile Apps] (explaining that the FDA communicated that health apps involving highly
sensitive or confidential information, such as a health condition or individual health data, do
not constitute enough risk to the public to merit FDA scrutiny).
119. 21 C.F.R. f 803.10 (2016); Medical Device Safety, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/5afety/default.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter Medical Device Safety].
120. 21 C.F.R. f 803.10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See infra Part II, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Scope of Application and
accompanying notes. (explaining generally the quality controls imposed on organizations to
ensure consumer safety); Medical Device Safety, supra note 119. The FDA posts
communications on its Website and sends email communications to those who register to
receive them. See, e.g., Medical Device Safety, supra note 119 (referencing specific safety
communications and linking to an email notification sign-up page).
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Commission to create a report on a proposed strategy for a risk-based
framework involving mobile applications. 124 The 2014 FDASIA Health IT
Report recognized four significant conclusions with respect to health
information technology that apply to the digital health cybersecurity
landscape and shape expectations regarding the FDA s involvement in
cybersecurity management 1) that existing FDA functionality is effective,
within a culture of safety and quality, including voluntary and non-punitive
reporting; 2) health IT should use recognized standards; 3) agency roles
should be clarified and avoid overlap; and 4) the FDA will not regulate
general, non-health-specific use of IT infrastructure or devices. 125 Further,
the F DASIA report clearly illustrated a continuing focus for regulatory
agencies on security principles, not applicable technical standards. 12 6
In 2014, the FDA began issuing pre- and post-release cybersecurity

124. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144,
f 618, 126 Stat. 993, 1063 (2012).
125. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FEDERAL COMMC NS COMM N, OFF..NATL
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT 3, 9 (Apr. 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Offi ceofM edical Productsand
Tobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf [hereinafter FDASIA WHITE PAPER]
(explaining that The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
(ONC), an office within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is
positioned in this report as focusing on privacy, security, and health Information Technology
(IT) infrastructure. Although the ONC has developed eight documents in collaboration with
the broader H HS and the OCR, these documents focus on healthcare providers, not on supplyside requirements for the digital health marketplace, and reiterated HIPAA requirements); see

Health IT Privacy and Security Resources,

OFF. NATL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO.

https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-privacy-security/resources (last
updated Feb. 12, 2016) (identifying resources to better integrate HIPAA and other federal
health information privacy into practice); Your Mobile Device and Health Inforation Privacy
and Security, OFF. NATL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., https://www.healthit.
gov/provi ders- professional s/your- mobi I e-devi ce-and-health-i nformati on-privacy-andsecurity (last updated Mar. 21, 2014).
126. F DASIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 125. Government agencies have not attempted to
implement specific security requirements in law because appropriate standards could change
frequently. However, although technology may change; frameworks, processes, practices, and
standards may not change as frequently. Frameworks offer a strong foundation without
articulating specific technical solutions. See, e.g., ISO/IEC 27001-Inforation security
TECH.,

anagement,

INTIL ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,

http://www.iso.org/iso/iso27001 (last

visited Oct. 9, 2016) (providing requirements for an information security management

system); What is COBIT 5?,

INFO.

Sys. AUDIT

AND CONTROL

Ass-N, http:/ANww.isaca.org/

COBIT/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (describing a model used most often for
IT audit purposes); Guidance, COMMITTEE SPONSORING ORGs. TREADWAY COMM N,
http://www.coso.org/guidance.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2016); Understanding and Leveraging
the CSF, HITRUST ALLIANCE, https://hitrustalliance.net/understanding-leveraging-csf/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2016) (explaining the value of using the HITRUST model for information

security in the health care industry); Cybersecurity Frarrework,

NATL INST. STANDARDS AND

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/(last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (explaining why the
new NIST cybersecurity framework was created and is useful for organizations) [hereinafter
Cybersecurity Framework].
TECH.,
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guidelines and issued device vulnerability notices to assist device
manufacturers in producing and managing devices less likely to adversely
impact consumers. 127 The 2014 Pre-Release Cybersecurity Guidelines
addressed incorporating cybersecurity considerations in the design and
development of medical devices as part of 'software validation and risk
analysis... [in] 21 CFR 820.30(g). _128 The FDA recommended
incorporating asset identification, threat analysis, and vulnerability reviews
into an organization s devi ce development process, including risk assessment
and analysis, to determine residual risk and apply mitigation strategies.129
Such processes should take into consideration the intended use and
implementation of a device, such as home use. 130 Moreover, medical device
manufacturers are encouraged to specify 'cybersecurity safeguards_ in
premarket submission processes, such as 'hazard analysis_ and 'design
considerations_ for a medical device, and risks like device cybersecurity
1
controls considered or implemented. 31
The premarket cybersecurity safeguards recommending asset
identification, threat analysis, and vulnerability reviews, reflect a level of
standardization in cybersecurity practice. 132 These standards incorporate best
practice cybersecurity capabilities, such as access and identity
management' the capability that bars unauthorized users from accessing a
system, code validation and management, cybersecurity incident response
capabilities, and business continuity' continuing function of devices even
when compromised.133 These standards have been established by the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the 'world-s leading

127. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS
FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES 1 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/
downl oads/medi caldevi ces/devi ceregulati onandguidance/guidancedocumrents/uci3561 90.pd

f

[hereinafter CYBERSECURITY WHITE PAPER].

128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at4.
130. Id. ('Manufacturers should also carefully consider the balance between
cybersecurity safeguards and the usability of the device in its intended environment of use(e.g
home use vs. health care facility use).
131. Id. at 4-5.
132. See, e.g., Michael Muckin & Scott C. Fitch, A Threat-Driven Approach to Cyber
Security, LOCKHEED MARTIN 5, http://lockheedrmrtin.com/content/dam/lockheed/datalisgs/
documents/Threat-Driven%20Approach%20whitepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2016)
(advocating a threats-assets-controls relational model, which shifts focus from vulnerability
analysis to threat analysis); ChristopherJ. Alberts et al., Operationally Critical Threat Asset
and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Framework, Version 1.0, CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIVERSITY UJune 1999), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/assetfiles/f echni cal R eport/1 999
005 001 16769.pdf (describing a security risk management approach involving asset
management vulnerability analysis, and threat identification originating as early as 1999).
133. Id.
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organization_ for electrical technologies. 134
The FDA -s Guidance for Industry-Cybersecurity for Networked Medical
Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf (OTS) Software explicitly allocated
responsibility for new cybersecurity activities under existing FDCA laws
governing technology validation processes. 13 The Guidance further
explained that manufacturers should work with vendors to timely receive
cybersecurity updates, such as patches, and develop a 'cybersecurity
maintenance plan. _136
In January 2016, the FDA distributed the Postrnrket Management of
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices for comment purposes.137 This guidance
document reiterated the responsibility of manufacturers to include
cybersecurity considerations throughout product development and to
continuously monitor for device vulnerabilities throughout each device-s
lifecycle13 Specifically, the FDA recommends following the NIST
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, a risk
management framework, and also sharing identified cybersecurity risks and
security incident data via the National Health Information Sharing
Analysis Center.131
134.

About the IEC Vision & Mission,

INT-L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMIN (2016),

http://www.iec.ch/about/.
135. U.S. FOOD & DRUG
NETWORKED MEDICAL

ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY' CYBERSECURITY FOR
DEVICES CONTAINING OFF-THE-SHELF (OTS) SOFTWARE (May 28,

2015), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocum

ents/ucm077812.htm [hereinafter

GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].

136. Id. (The FDA specified that such patches would not be required because 'most
software patches . . reduce the risk of developing a problem associated with a cybersecurity
vulnerability and not to address a risk to health posed by the device . . If the software patch
affects the safety or effectiveness of a medical device, you should report the correction to
FDA. Although in most cases, a patch is used to neutralize a vulnerability, it is important to
remember that vulnerabilities always pose some risk to a device that is used for health
purposes. For example, a patch closes a vulnerability that allows an unverified user to change
data in transit between the medical device and the receiver, for example a data analysis
application. If data is changed, the data in the analysis is incorrect, and decisions for treatment
negatively affecting patient safety could be made); see, e.g., Patricia AH Williams & Andrew
J. Woodward, Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in Medical Devices: A Complex Environment and

Multifaceted Problem 8

MED DEVICES (AUCKL)

305 (2015) (noting that most if not all

patches will have some bearing on safety of medical devices).
137. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN
MEDICAL DEVICES 1 (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/redicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482022.pdf [hereinafter POSTMARKET
MANAGEMENT].

138.
139.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6; NAT

& TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
1 (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/cyberfram-ework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf;
Promoting Private Sector
Cybersecurity Information Sharing, Executive Order 13691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9349 (Feb. 13,
2015), https:/ANww.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-20/pdf/2015-03714.pdf; Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015); U.S. DEPT OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
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The FDA also recommends monitoring for cybersecurity vulnerabilities,
assessing potential vulnerability impact, and developing nitigation
strategies, including deploying patches or remediating code to neutralize
vulnerabilities.140 These recommendations represent industry standard
vulnerability management practices, and very thoroughly explain the
relationship between vulnerabilities and essential clinical performance. 14 1
Although the Postrnrket Guidelines do not establish binding rules for
manufacturers, the details expressed a relatively comprehensive
understanding of vulnerability management practices, which significantly
affect the ability of a manufacturer to manage medical device risk.142
5. Scope of Application
In 2015, the FDA directly communicated its intention to regulate only
mobile applications classified as 'medical devices_ where their function(s)
could pose a risk to patient safety, though it began communicating its overall
reluctance to regulate mobile health applications in 2014.143 In January of
2016, the FDA first reiterated and solidified its intention to minimize its
involvement in mobile application regulation, in particular general wellness
products. 14 This recent, non-binding direction effectively focuses attention
HOMELAND SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY SHARING ACT OF 2015 FINAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
- NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY (June 15, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-06-

&

15/pdfl2016-13742.pdf. The ISACs were created in response to Executive Order 13691 on
information sharing, included in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.
140. POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT, supra note 137, at 11 -12.
141. See generally Murugiah Souppaya & Karen Scarfone, NAT LINST. OF STANDARDS
TECH., GUIDE To ENTERPRISE PATCH MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES, 3rd ed. (2013),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPubications/NIST.SP.800-40r3.pdf (explaining the
industry standards for enterprise patch management technologies); Tom Palmaers,
Implementing a Vulnerability Management Programr SANS INST. (2013), https://www.
sans.org/reading-roomwhitepapers/threats/implerrenting-vulnerability-managementprocess-34180. Although the FDA Postmarket Guidance does not specify the level of detail
explained via NIST and SANS, the conceptual vulnerability management language references
these types of prograns; and additional detail is introduced to assist manufacturers in
considering medical device risk, such as vulnerability scoring and health impact rankings;
POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT, supra note 137, at 13-15.
142. POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT, supra note 137; see CYBERSECURITY WHITE PAPER,
supra note 127 (illustrating the agency awareness of security risks potentially affecting the
medical device community).
143. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 8(Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/.. ./UCM263366.pdf [hereinafter MOBILE MEDICAL]; Examples
of Mobile Apps, supra note 118; see Mobile Medical Applications, Guidance for Industry and
Food and Drug Administration Staff- Availability, 78 Fed. Reg 59038 (Sept. 25, 2013)
(L EX IS) (illustrating the FDA-s intent to apply regulatory requirements to only a small subset
of mobile apps).
144. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR Low RISK DEVICES
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 2 (July 26, 2016),
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on implanted and physically invasive connected devi ces and Classes II and
III, which the FDA deems not 'low risk,_ and it neglects Class I devices. 145
In the FDA s Mobile Medical Apps Guidance, issued in February 2015,
the FDA gave specific examples of mobi Ie medical apps where the FDA nmy
exercise enforcement and reiterated the F DA s sole focus on patient safety.14 6
These examples include medical devices providing technology to monitor
patients, conduct data analysis, or for controlling the medical device via a
mobile application (Type A, see Table 1); mobile applications connecting to
sensors, displays, or attachments of existing medical devices (Type B, see
Table 1); and mobile apps that perform the functions of existing diagnostic
or therapeutic software, most likely Class II and Class III devices. 14 7
Reinforcing the FDA s focus on patient safety, the FDA also listed mobile
apps for which the FDA will exercise enforcement discretion, or choose not
to regulate.148 The FDA will not actively regulate the majority of these apps
that may be vulnerable to information loss, including apps that help patients
manage disease, track health information, provide remote medical care,
provide access to health information, or transfer data from a medical device
(Types C-E, see Table 1).149 In short, the FDA has demonstrated it will
regulate direct physical safety, not data loss or disclosure.
The FDA has the ability, via statute and practice, to manage and monitor
Class II and Class III medical devices. 1s0 However, the lack of clear direction
of organizational and technical cybersecurity requirements coupled with a
reluctance to regulate Class I devices and a significant proportion of mobile
applications does not position the FDA to effectively manage cybersecurity
risk in the digital health marketplace.
PART III: PROPOSED REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

T he existing statutory framework regulating the digital health marketplace
is not sufficient to reduce and manage cybersecurity risk. FDA guidelines do
not effectively manage a market heavily driven by compliance-oriented
activities, and entities required to follow HIPAA only covers a subsection of

http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddevgen/docum-ents/docum-ent/ucm429674.pdf [hereinafter GENERAL WELLNESS].
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
MOBILE MEDICAL,

supra note 143, at 13.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15-18.
Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways Medical Devices:

The Basics, U.S.

FOOD

& DRUG

ADMIN.,

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Off

iceofM edical ProductsandfTobacco/C DR H/C DR HT ransparency/ucm203018.htm (last updated
Nov. 27, 2015).
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organizations involved in creating digital health products and services."'
Unlike internal confidential data loss affecting an organization only, parties
affected by insufficient cybersecurity controls can be patients or consumers,
often individuals in a compromised health position. 15 2 Many patients assume,
given the FDA-s involvement in device safety matters and HIPAA-s
coverage of PHI, that health safety and confidentiality meet existing industry
best practices.1 3 Others may not be able to effectively advocate their
interests, either because of health status or comparatively less bargaining
power.1 54
Because the market cannot effectively guarantee this protection and
patients often expect a basic level of safety for digital health products, a
regulatory framework provides the best option for managing cybersecurity
risk. However, achieving a level of specificity inthelawthatactually reduces
risk requires knowledge and regulation of technology as it actually works.155
Although computer systems collect, compile, process, transfer, display, or
store data, specific implementations may use different variations of security
controls to meet a security principle, for example, methods for managing
password resets. 15 6 Frameworks should balance specificity with flexibility to

151.

Heather Landi, Medical Device Cybersecurity Needs Enforceable Regulations, Not

Just Suggestions,

HEALTHCARE

INFORMATICs

(Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.healthcare-

inforrmtics.cornnews-item/mnedical-device-cybersecurity-needs-enforceable-regulationsnot-just-suggestions-icit-says; Derek Mohammed et al., Cybersecurity Challenges and

Compliance Issues within the U.S. Healthcare Sector, 5 INT

LJ.

Bus. & Soc.

RESEARCH

55,

57 (2015), http://www.saintleo.edu/media/975946/cybersecurity challengesandcomplian
ceissues.pdf.
152. Following from the recognition that for the digital health marketplace, participants
using devices and apps often have a particular health condition, some very serious in nature.
See M ohamrned et al., supra note 151, at 56.
153. See Pam Dixon, What-s a Consumer to Do? Consumer Perceptions and Expectations
of Privacy Online, Testimony Before the Subcomnittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and

Trade of the House Comittee on Energy and Commerce,

WORLD PRIVACY FORUM

3 (Oct.

13, 2011), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10PamDixonCon
surrerExpectationTestirmonyfsshort.pdf (testifying on how consumers often do not have the
information or opportunity to evaluate the status and treatment of their information, and
disconnect exists between what consumers believe organizations do to protect information and
what organizations actually do).
154. See McGraw et al., infra note 173 (illustrating that large business associates, with
great bargaining power, can more easily dictate the terms of their security compliance).
155. In my experience, this challenge has borne out in HIPAA compliance schemes. It is
my opinion that because encryption is an 'addressable_ requirement under HIPAA, many
organizations do not encrypt data and when they do, employ poor encryption practices simply
to meet the requirement. Poor practices do not significantly improve an organization-s ability
to protect individual's PHI. Similarly, high-level general FDA guidelines will not likely
establish the structure necessary to measurably reduce cybersecurity for medical devices.
156. MathewJ. Schwartz, 5 Ways to Solve the Password Reset Dilemin, DARK READING
(A ug. 14, 2012), http://www.darkreading.comattacks-and-breaches/5-ways-to-solve-thepassword-reset-problem/d/d-id/1 105781.
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ensure adequate adherence without stifling cybersecurity innovation.
Although a framework could improve cybersecurity for the digital health
marketplace, no clear and comprehensive regulatory responsibility currently
exists. Overlapping administrative agency responsibilities between the FDA,
OCR, the ONC, and the FTC results in a lack of clear cybersecurity direction
and accountability for digital health providers.1 17 Both part of H HS, the OCR
monitors HIPAA compliance for CEs and BAs while the FDA evaluates
FDCA compliance for medical devices."' Meanwhile, the ONC, also part of
H HS, creates high-level standards for cybersecurity and privacy and the FTC
establishes rules and holds organizations accountable for unfair or deceptive
trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, increasingly for privacy and
cybersecurity concerns."' This m9ange of guidance exists, yet no clear
stance has emerged that provides a level of specificity, leaving organizations
with few options aside from inventing rules inconsistently and
independently. 160
Of these four regulatory bodies, the OCR and the FDA have mature
regulatory frameworks with specific health and medical device industry
expertise.16 1
157. David Raths, Digital Health Dilerrms: Regulators Struggle to Keep Pace with
Health-Care Technology Innovation, Gov-T TECH. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.govtech.
corn/health/Digital-Health-Dilemma-Regulators-Struggle-to-Keep-Pace-with-Health-CareTechnology-Innovation.htn.
158. See Part II.
159. See, e.g., Iltifat Husain, FTC, Notthe F DA, Tells the Digital Health World They Need
Peer Reviewed Data to Back Up Their Claims, IMEDICALAPPs U an. 7, 2016), http://www.
imedical apps.com/2016/01/ftc-fda-digital-health (describing the FTC-s role in ensuring that
claims are truthful and non-deceptive while also discussing the FTC-s growing role in
reviewing health products).
160. Jonah Comstock, Time to Reform HIPAA and FDA Regs for Digital Health Era?,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (July 13, 2016, 5:01 PM), http://www.healthcareitnews.comnews/ti me-reform-hi paa-and-fda-regs-digital-health-era; Ed Miserta, mHealth Panel: Make
Progress, Not Excuses, CLINICAL LEADER (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.clinicalleader.
com/doc/mheal th- panel- make- progress-not-excuses-0001.
161. See Part II; HIPAA and the FDCA are typically considered potential regulatory
frameworks for managing cybersecurity in the digital health marketplace due to their relatively
mature frameworks (HIPAA with its focus on PHI and the FDCA with its focus on medical
devices). Further, the OCR and the FDA have been regulating HIPAA and FDCA for,
respectively, 20 and 110 years. The OCR has significantly moved the needle toward increased
enforcement and activity for privacy and security. On the 20th anniversary of HIPAA, the
OCR described how HIPAA has revolutionized the very nature of healthcare and noted the
changing natureof health technology, especially mobile health. U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.,

U.S.

DEP-T OF LABOR &

U.S.

DEPT OF TREASURY,

HIPAA at 20: A Bipartisan

Achievement HHS BLOG (Aug. 19 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/blog/2016/08/19/hipaa-20bipartisan-achieverrent.html. The FDA has also increased its reach as new technologies
emerged. See Colin Zick et al., Regulation Electronic Health Records and Clinical Decision
Support FOLEY H OAG, LLP (j an. 2014), http://www.foleyhoag.com/-/media/files/foley%20ho
ag/speaki ng%20engagerrents/2014/zickehrafdaonc regulation-of_ health_ it.ashx?l a=en
(describing FDA proposed regulation and workgroup implemented in order to address then-
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B. The Office for Civil Rights: Steady Executor
HHS OCR provides oversight for HIPAA compliance, which includes
management of the HIPAA Security Rule.162 Although the HHS and OCR
have worked with the FT C to create guidance for digital health cybersecurity
topics, such as a Mobile Health Apps Interactive T ool, 163 the OC R has
preferred to focus on its HIPAA obligations.1" Absent broad omnibus
privacy or cybersecurity legislation, the OCR has created a strong
enforcement structure and fairly clear guidance for privacy and security
requirements applicable to PHI within the United States, at least illustrating
its broad reach. 16s
For CEs and BAs subject to HIPAA, HIPAA does require some level of
cybersecurity compliance, albeit somewhat limited to highly flexible,
general, and presumably avoidable security specifications. 16 6 Despite less
emerging categories software). Software has been subject to FDA regulation since the 1980s,
even though Congress did not expressly direct the FDA to manage software. The FDA
regulates both devices AND accessories to medical devices. The FTC also regulates mobile
medical applications and drafted guidance in 2013 updating in 2015. See MOBILE MEDICAL,
supra note 143 (issuing updated guidance on mobile medical applications).
162. See Part II, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
163. Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, FED. TRADE COMM-N (Apr. 2016), https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-apps-interactive-tool.
164. See Part II, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. The OCR has
focused the majority of its time in creating and audit process, auditing, and investigating
24,331 cases with settlements totaling $39,989,200. Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcerrent/data/enforcement-highlightsfindex.htnl.
165. Daniel J. Solove, HIPAA Might and Flawed: Regulation HasWide-Reaching Im-pact
on the Healthcare Industry, 84 J. OF AHIMA 30-31 (2013), http://bok.ahirm.org/doc?
oid=106326#.V81XWfkrLIU. The OCR s use of 'Final Omnibus Rule is a bitof arrisnomer.
Omnibus is used to reference broadly applicable privacy laws internationally, such as Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPE DA) in Canada orthe Global Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union. Sectoral and Omnibus Privacy and
Data Protection Laws, NYMITY (2015), https://www.nymity.com-/media/Nymity/Files/
Privacy%20Maps/NY MITY _World_ Map.ashx.
166. See Part II, The HIPAA Security Rule; Historically, the OCR has not prosecuted
HIPAA Security Ruleviolations except where a violation has already caused a data breach or
where a complaint has been filed; see, e.g., Data Breach Results in $4.8 Million HIPAA
Settlements, U.S. DEP T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-profess
ionals/comrpliance-enforcerrent/exarmples/new-york-and-Presbyterian-hospital/index.htnA
(last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (listing two listed settlements, both of which closed lawsuits
brought upon by HHS receiving a notice of a data breach within each organization); see also
Matthew A. Fisher, First Ever OCR Settlement of Enforcement Action against HIPAA
Business Associate Due to PHI Breach - $650,000 Monetary Resolution Payrent,
POYNERSPRUILL LLP (July 13, 2016), http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/Pages/
FirstOC RSettlementofE nforcementActionagai nstHIPAA B usinessAssociateDuetoPHIB reach
.aspx (describing an OCR settlement with a Business Associate, which closed an action
brought after the reported theft of the Business Associate employee-s PHI-filled yet
unencrypted - and noncompliant - phone); see also OCR Penalizes Physician Practice for
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule Violations, HIPAA.coM (Apr. 18, 2012),
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restrictive cybersecurity requirements in the HIPAA statute, the HIPAA
regulatory structure, in particular the OCR s enforcement activity, has
evolved over eighteen years to become comparatively stronger than preHITECH HIPAA OCR activity.16 7
Unfortunately, the existing roles within HIPAA significantly limit the
OCR-s ability to fully regulate the digital health marketplace.' 1 CEs only
include health plans, healthcare providers, and healthcare clearinghouses, a
limited set of organizations with very specific purposes. 169 Manufacturers
and developers of digital health products, therefore, would likely not be
considered CEs unless their services are provided directly to consumers and
the services are reimbursable by iTnsurance.1 T he BA role may include some
manufacturers and developers if providing digital health solutions through a
CE, but collectively CE and BA roles alone do not encompass direct-toconsumer digital health technologies, leaving a large portion of the digital
health marketplace regulated only by catch-all FTC enforcement.17 1
Further, the HIPAA model cannot sufficiently regulate digital health
cybersecurity because it exhibits a pull, demand-side compliance model.172
https://www.hi paa.com'ocr-penal izes-physici an-practi ce-for-hi paa-privacy-and-securityrule-violations/(describing an HHS resolution with a Physician Practice following its HIPAA
violations).
167. See HIPAA enforcement actions, supra note 166 (representing a fraction of HIPAA
enforcement actions which ultimately serve to strengthen the OCR -s regulatory scheme); see
generally Part II, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and accompanying
notes (describing CE and BA roles and statutory requirements).
168. EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 11, at 15.
169. See Part II, HIPAA Classification and Applicability.
170. Id.
171. Id. Although the BA role is comparatively large and has been applied in a variety of
business contexts, the BA role depends on its relationship with a Covered E ntity. Because a
Covered Entity is fairly narrow in application, BA applicability also leaves out significant
portions of the Digital Health marketplace. Although the Federal Trade Commission does
enforce unfair and deceptive trade practices, the FTC Act gives power to the FTC to regulate
data security practices, but does not directly create statutory requirements for organizations to
meet on the front end. See Kathryn F. Russo, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation et al.
and the FTC-s Authority to Regulate Companies- Data Security Practices, 23 COMPETITION:
J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 164, 166-68 (2014) (describing the Wyndham
case outcome substantiating the FTC-s ability to bring actions under the FTC Act for data
security practices amounting to unfair or deceptive trade practices). The FTC does have
rulemaking authority as specifically allocated according to statute, such as the Health Breach
Notification Rule, incorporated into the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009;
see 16 C.F.R. Part 318.
172. This Article does not address whether privacy should be included in consumer
protection statutes because Congress has already enshrined that decision in substantial
legislation, including HIPAA. That said, the regulatory structure of HIPAA does not require
pre-market approval or validation before a process or device is released to the public; this
structure relies on voluntary compliance. Otherwise, this structure carries substantial potential
penalties if an entity does not comply, additionally in which case either the OCR audits the
entity or someone files a complaint; see Part II, Health Insurance Portability and
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Essentially, the HIPAA model depends on purchasers demanding compliance
of products that are currently on the market in comparison to the FDA s
barrier for entry: CEs purchasing products or services from a BA and
individual consumers purchasing products or services from a CE must have
the requisite bargaining power and knowledge to ensure CE or BA
compliance prior to purchase.17 3 If CE s or BA s do not choose to fully comply
with HIPAA, consumers or CEs accept the risk or file a complaint with the
OCR. 174 In contrast, for BAs who have less bargaining power, CEs may
demand more stringent requirements than HIPAA compliance requires,17 1
potentially resulting in additional barriers to market or lack of good faith and
fair dealing when BAs agree to terms they cannot meet.176 HIPAA s lack of
preemptory power, wide variation of bargaining power between parties, and
'after the fact_ compliance management is a poor fit for mass-produced or
developed digital health products and services with fewer opportunities for
significant change after development or manufacture. 17 When a
manufacturer has developed a product or service offering before selling to a

Accountability Act. In contrast approval-based compliance with continuing obligations
provides a better fit both to ensure comrpl iance before market entry in order to safeguard safety
in the digital health marketplace and ultimately instill consumer confidence; see Part III, The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration: Reluctant Leader.
173. Deven McGraw et al., Business Associate Compliance With HIPAA: Findings
From a Survey of Covered Entities and Business Associates, MANATT, https://www.
manatt.com'getattachment/Obl 9cc2d-edl4-458b-a4bc-7b4436437c4f/attachment.aspx;
Although HITECH updates made clear BAs- independent HIPAA compliance, somewhat
removing complete reliance on a pull model, Congress presupposes that the OCR knows of a
particular organization and holds it accountable. While the OCR could use various measures
to ascertain BAs, such as registration of Business Associate Agreements or annual disclosures
of BAs, Congress has not yet required such actions of Covered Entities; compare Part II,
HIPAA with Part II, FDCA (particularly note substantial activities required of organizations
seeking to market products in the United States).
174. How to File a Health Information Privacy or Security Complaint U.S. DEP-T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/fi Ii ng-a-compl ai nt/complai nt-process/
index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2016) (explaining that despite a complaint process,
complaints filed after product development cannot prevent data exposure or potential physical
injuries, simply because enforcement action occurs after development and product release).
175. See McGraw et al., supra note 173 (noting how variability in compliance terms can
create market issues: in particular, with unpredictable expectations some organizations may
face a significant barrier to entry in the market reducing competition).
176. Id. (describing that some BAs may agree to terms without fully understanding
obligations, and some CEs may not have the requisite resources to conduct risk assessments
on all BAs to ensure compliance).
177. See Part II, HIPAA Security Rule and accompanying notes (noting that HIPAA
works more effectively for organizations that manage ongoing HIPAA compliance, such as
health care providers) (explaining that such organizations can plan additions and changes to
privacy and security programs, and HIPAA requirements heavily reference privacy and
security business processes (explaining that for medical devices, substantial issues identified
after the fact can involve recalls, costing significant amounts of money)).
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CE, the likelihood of consumer injury increases. 178
In addition to concerns regarding the breadth of HIPAA regulatory effects
and the ability for HIPAA to meaningfully prevent consumer injury, the
digital health marketplace also requires more robust and comprehensive
cybersecurity specifications to sufficiently manage cybersecurity risk."
HIPAA privacy and security specifications fit the roles of CEs and BAs as
traditionally understood, rather than as product manufacturers or service
providers.so Focusing on general IT functions, high level organizational
process, and risk management techniques, rather than product development
and service requirements or validation procedures does not effectively direct
the specificity often needed in the development process.181
While the OCR provides active HIPAA enforcement, HIPAA limits
applicability to specified entities, leaving a significant gap of uncovered
entities.18 2 In the rare circumstance that Congress would expand definitions
of HIPAA entities, the HIPAA compliance model does not effectively
manage consumer risk for entities manufacturing and developing products.183
Absent significant statutory revision, it is unlikely that OCR oversight could
effectively manage broad digital health cybersecurity risk.
A. The U.S. Food and Drug Adninistration: Reluctant Leader
The FDA has signaled its reluctance to manage cybersecurity in a variety
of ways, including statements that the ONC manages privacy and
cybersecurity standards for health IT and that the FDA will not regulate

178. See Part II (following the logical conclusion of demand-side compliance, the best
case occurs when and if CEs have bargaining power to demand HIPAA compliance of BAs;
the worst case when and if the OCR holds BAs accountable) (nothing how in both
circumstances, compliance expectations are communicated after, rather than before a BA
creates an unsecure product causing consumer injury).
179. See Part II, HIPAA Security Rule and accompanying notes; see Raths, supra note
157.
180. See Raths, supra note 157 (describing how the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not rmtch
a fast-moving, digital health mrketplace with increasingly mobile connectivity and how,
similarly, security specifications could include standard product development measures, such
as code scanning prior to release, effective code merging and management, standard
authentication procedures and identity validation); see Part III.
181. R aths, supra note 157.
182. See Part II, HIPAA Classification and accompanying notes.
183. See Part II and accompanying notes. Because Covered Entities (CE) and Business
Associates (BA) are highly specific roles under HIPAA, requiring a variety of conditions to
be in place before HIPAA applies, relying only on HIPAA to regulate the digital health
marketplace would not effectively manage cybersecurity risk across the digital health market
as many organizations are not required to be compliant with HIPAA. If Congress expanded
these definitions, the lack of comprehensive cybersecurity requirements would still not
effectively manage cybersecurity risk, due to the gaps in required cybersecurity activities for
CE and BA.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2017

31

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 26 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 3

32

Annals of Health Law

V ol. 26

general health apps. 1" Despite this, the FDA has the regulatory structure,
function, and focus to effectively regulate the digital health marketplace with
some involvement from OCR, FTC, and ONC partners."
The FDA first must officially include the digital health products and
services in its definition of medical device. This change will require
compliance with standard quality measures included in a quality system
under the F D CA.86 Today, the FDA does not recognize many potential Class
I devices, like mobile health applications, as medical devices." With an
ever-increasing focus on loT technologies, non-invasive sensor-based care,
and health data loss, the FDA cannot avoid acting in the best interests of
consumers." Similar to the extension of the FDCA s interpretation of
'contrivance_ to include computer software in 1989, the FDA should
embrace its responsibility for regulating other computer-based
applications.189 Many benefits to the consumer will naturally extend from
FDCA regulatory controls, including required inclusion of a quality
management system, policy devel opment and standard operating procedures,
accountability, and employee training.190 These general controls map well to
a standardized cybersecurity program.
To fully realize the benefits of an FDA-managed model for the digital
health marketplace, the FDA will need to adjust its use of the 510(k) and
PMA processes as they apply to digital health products. At least initially, the
FDA should consider requiring all Class I and II digital health devices to
submit a 510(k). 19 1 The 510(k) provides a level of additional confidence in
products via required disclosures, and the FDA holds discretion over required
information disclosed via this process.192 The FDA could easily incorporate

184. See FDASIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 125; see also GENERAL WELLNESS, supra
note 144.
185. See Part II, FDCA, and accompanying notes (explaining that although Class I
medical devices receive no oversight and health mobile apps do not require compliance with
the FDCA, the framework for pre-market disclosures, quality management programs, and
post-market obligations matches most product development lifecycles).
186. See Part II, FDCA, Applicability, and accompanying notes.
187. See GENERAL WELLNESS, supra note 144.
188. See Glaser, supra note 9.
189. John F. Murray, Jr., CDRH Regulated Software, REG. AFF. PROFL Soc-Y 6 (Oct.
2011), http://sterlingmedicaldevices.comwp-content/uploads/2011/11/jrmurray-fdapresentati
on-softwarerapsi ndi anapol i soctober201 1.pdf.
190. See Part II, FDCA, Medical Device Market Obligations and accompanying notes.
191. This author notes that a 501(k) is not without cost: in 2014, the average fees were
$2,585 for small businesses and $5,170 for large businesses. See Alexander Gaffney,
Regulatory Explainer: Why and how is FDA Regulating Mobile Apps? REG. AFF. PROFL
Soc v (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/article/
4889/. It is recommended that with introduction of Class I devices, average fees could be
reduced with comparatively less scrutiny (than Class II devices) and investment of FDA time.
192. 21 C.F.R. f 807.92 (2016).
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a requirement for organizations to disclose details of their cybersecurity risk
management programs, including information about the secure development
lifecycle included within a quality program and plans for continuing
vulnerability management such as an ability to remotely patch devices or
provide hot fixes, or deploy new releases (See Table 3 for examples of
Cybersecurity risk management domains typically addressed in security
frameworks)." This activity would enable the FDA to hold a significant
number of organizations accountable to what otherwise is rendered
optional.19

Class III devices should also require serious inquiry into cybersecurity
controls. Although Class III devices do require rigorous testing activities and
comprehensive disclosures under the F DCA, these disclosures do not directly
include cybersecurity practices.195 Absent Congressional intervention, the
FDA can interpret PMA content requirements under the FDCA to require
detailed specification of cybersecurity controls and testing procedures. For
example, an organization should disclose device-specific controls and quality
process-based controls within the Product Description portion of the PMA.196
Further, the FDCA requires organizations to disclose deviation both from
FDCA performance standards and voluntary standards.19 7 The FDA could
require organizations to disclose why they chose notto incorporatethe NIST
security framework, standards, or other applicable standards." Allowing an
organization to disclose its cybersecurity approach enables flexibility in
choosing which standards are applied while simultaneously ensuring that
standards are applied. Although some have proposed the creation of a
government-led task force to determine cybersecurity standards; existing

193.

10 Security Dormins, AHIMA HIM

BODY OF KNOWLEDGE,

http:/Aibrary.ahima.org/

doc?oid=107038#.WBEystUrLIU (last visited Oct. 26, 2016); ISO 27001 Dornins, Control
Objectives, and Controls, DAN VASILE INFOSEC ADV ENTURES & MORE BLOG (Nov. 11, 2011),
https://www. pentest. roi so-27001 -domai ns-control -objectives-and-controls; CY BERSECURITY
FRAMEWORK (EXCEL), NAT. INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://www.nist.gov/document3764 (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
194. See Part II, FDA Reports and Cybersecurity Guidance and accompanying notes; See
generally J anes Scott & Drew Spaniel, Assessing the F DAs Cybersecurity Guidelines for

Medical Manufacturers Why Subtle :Suggestions- May Not Be Enough, INST. FOR CRITICAL
TECH. (Feb. 2016), http://icitech.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ICIT-

INFRASTRUCTURE

B log- F DA-Cyber-Security-G uidel i nes2.pdf.
195. 21 C.F.R. f 814.20(2016). Although Class III devices require submission of clinical
trial data as part of the PMA process, a significantly onerous requirement Class III devices
are not required to provide details of security testing, such as code scans, vulnerability scans,
or penetration testing results.
196. 21 C.F.R. f1 814.20(b)(3)-(4) (2016).
197. 21 C.F.R. f 814.20(b)(5) (2016).
198. See Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 126 (describing how many frameworks
can be used for cybersecurity purposes, although NIST provides very comprehensive and
specific standards for technology).
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standards, existing agencies, standard FDA submission procedures, and a
willingness to regulate can solve existing digital health marketplace
cybersecurity challenges so long as the FDA assumes the responsibility to
develop cybersecurity technical competency.1
The FDA should also ensure organizations marketing Class II and III
devices continuously evaluate marketed devices for potential cybersecurity
issues. Organizations with approved or cleared Class II and III devices
already have a responsibility to disclose potential safety issues for devices
when devices are: 1) designed to be implanted for more than a year, 2) sustain
life, or 3) where failure would reasonably have serious adverse health
consequences. 2m Based on this direction, the FDA can distinguish between
quality activities including routine cybersecurity management, such as
upgrades and updates, and emergency fixes or patches resulting from
identified vulnerabilities.201 Information sharing between private
organizations and governmental agencies such as the Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (ISAC) and the Information Sharing and Analysis
Organization (ISAO), will likely include the National Health Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (NHISAC) ISAC and the Health Information
Trust Alliance (HIT RUST) for the health market.202 These organizations can
provide resources for organizations to effectively monitor threats, manage
vulnerabilities, and respond to incidents as part of an ongoing quality

199. See Hagen, supra note 114, 31-33 (explaining how incorporating the 'Least
Burdensome Approach_ likely means pernitting organizations to exhibit some flexibility in
incorporating appropriate standards, yet reviewing the sufficiency of these standards and
design prior to market release).
200. 21 C.F.R. f 822.4 (2016).
201. See Part II, FDA Medical Device Market Obligations and accompanying notes
(describing how class II and III devices require postmarket surveillance); see GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY, supra note 135. The FDA has previously specified that patches would not be
required because 'most software patches . . reduce the risk of developing a problem
associated with a cybersecurity vulnerability and not to address a risk to health posed by the
device... If the software patch affects the safety or effectiveness of a medical device, you
should report the correction to FDA._ Although in most cases, a patch is used to neutralize a
vulnerability, it is important to remember that vul nerabi I ities always pose some risk to a device
that is used for health purposes. For example, a patch closes a vulnerability that allows an
unverified user to change data in transit between the medical device and the receiver, for
example a data analysis application. If data is changed, the data in the analysis is incorrect
and decisions for treatment negatively affecting patient safety could be made; see, e.g., Patricia
A.H. Williams & AndrewJ. Woodward, CybersecurityVulnerabilities in Medical Devices: A
Complex Environment and Multifaceted Problemr 8 MED. DEVICES (AUCK.) 305 (2015).
Ultimately, most, if not all patches will have some bearing on safety of medical devices.
202. See 21 C.F.R. f 822.4; Exec. Order No.13636, 80 Fed. Reg. 11739(Feb. 19, 2013);
About Us, NAT-L HEALTH-ISAC (2016), https://nhisac.org/about-nhisac/ Who We Serve,
HEALTH INFO. TRUST ALLIANCE

(2016), https://hitrustalliance.net/ (explaining how class I

devices in the digital health marketplace will require ongoing quality measures specific to the
function of such devices (e.g. an application is fundamentally different than surgical gloves in
that it requires continuous maintenance), not just a standard mnufacturing quality process).
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management system for Class I devices and pursuant to FDCA post-market
surveillance requirements for Class II and III devices.203
The FDA will also need to more actively regulate behavior of
organizations when information arises regarding organizational noncompliance with the FDCA, as the FDA has interpreted those regulatory
requirements. The OCR has taken significant steps to hold HIPAA entities
accountable, and the FDA may also need to more rigorously evaluate
organizations marketing Class I devices given the comparatively flexible
regulatory responsibilities for these devices. 20 Despite less potential for
physical injury, Class I devices, like mobile apps, also likely involve
processing, transfer, and storage of highly sensitive health information,
making them more likely to be a conduit for healthcare fraud.205 In particular,
the FDA can leverage its previous experience prosecuting for violations to
the quality system regulation to enforce effective cybersecurity quality
measures if the FDA learns of data breaches, failure to patch or remediate
devices with known vulnerabilities affecting individual safety or sensitive
personal information.20 6 Alternatively, the FDA could operate a modified
audit process, similar to recent OCR audits, involving self-disclosure or third
party certification.207 While this might require additional budgetary
allocation, coupling strong process with strong enforcement would likely
preserve maximum flexibility for organizations while creating the necessary
stringency to improve cybersecurity for consumers.
CONCLUSION

Although the OCR could provide some level of oversight for the digital
health marketplace, the FDA provides the most comprehensive regulatory
203. 21 C.F.R. f 822.4; NAT-L HEALTH-ISAC, supra note 202; HEALTH INFO. TRUST
ALLIANCE, supra note 202.
204. Compare Part II, HIPAA OCR Audit Protocol and Oversight and accompanying
notes, with Part II, FDA and accompanying notes. In addition, the FDA and OCR may need
to coordinate activities and choose when meeting certain requirements will suffice. For
example, if a Class II or III device is also regulated by HIPAA, security requirements
implemented and validated by the FDA should sufficiently meet the HIPAA Security Rule as
well, without additional showing to the OCR.
205. Jim Finkle, Exclusive: The FBI Warns Healthcare Sector Vulnerable to Cyber
Attacks, REUTERS (A pr. 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/articl e/us-cybersecurityhealthcarefbi-excl usiv-idUS BR EA3M 1Q920140423.
206. See, e.g., Federal Judge Approves Consent Decree with Maquet Holding B.V. & Co,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncerments/ucm432925.htm- FDA Enters Consent Decree with Medtronic,
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framework for digital health products and services and is well placed to solve
the digital health cybersecurity dilemma. In particular, a broader definition
of 'medical device_ and compulsory procedures under the FDCA, coupled
with FDA oversight and enhanced enforcement will enable the FDA to
manage products and services for a wide variety of health market
parti ci pants.
A corresponding set of cybersecurity requirements, compiled by
leveraging an established NIST cybersecurity framework, increases
predictability for consumers, healthcare providers, and digital health
organizations. The inclusion of such cybersecurity requirements in FDA
quality management requirements and 510(k) and PMA processes ensures
that products and services cannot enter or remain in the market without
implementing minimum cybersecurity controls. Overall, the FDA provides
the structure necessary to effectively incorporate a cybersecurity framework
and ensure compliance for the digital health marketplace.
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Digital Health Device Type
Reference

Device Type

Device Example

Type A

Implanted Devices (not networkaware, network-aware, application
compatible, data storage); includes
monitoring devices
Non-Implanted Bio Devices (device
only, data storage, network-aware)
Wearables (device only, networkaware, data storage)
Mobile A pp (app only, remote data

Pacemaker

Type B
Type C
Type D

X-ray Machine
Heart Rate Monitor
Remote Clinic App

storage - remote, local data storage)

Type E
Type F

Web Application (application only,
data storage)
General Administrative IT
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Diagnostic
Questionnaire
Patient
Intake Software
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Table 2: Digital Health Device Type with Cybersecurity Risks
Reference

Device Type

TypeA
(Class IIIII)

Implanted
Devices
(including
monitoring
devices)
NonImplanted Bio
Devices

Type B
(CI ass IIIII)

Inherent
Risk
Critical

High

Type C
(Class III)

Wearables

Medium

Type E
(C lassIIII)

MobileApp

Medium

Type D
(Class I)

Web
Application

Low

Type F
(Class I)

General
Administrative
IT

Medium

Published by LAW eCommons, 2017

Risk Description
Network-enabled devices are open to malware orviruses
impeding or changing function. Unauthorized users can
also launch attacks altering data, commands, or
configurations remotely. Loss of personal could also
result via remote data storage capabilities.
Network-enabled non-implanted devices are open to
malware, viruses, or attacks, many of which would likely
result in device inoperability, which could cause patient
safety hazards. Loss of personal information could also
result remote via data storage capabilities if healthcare
providers store medical record numbers or other
identifying information in the device.
Network-enabled wearables are open to malware,
viruses, or attacks that could result in device
inoperability. Attacks could alter data reliability, causing
unnecessary concern or treatment. Wearables also pose
significant concern for loss of personal information due
to the connectivity with mobile devices.
Network-enabled mobile devices are open to malware,
viruses, or attacks that could result in device
inoperability and personal information loss. Thick client
mobile apps often function offline, which means that
significant data volumes can be stored on a mobile
device.
Web Applications are subject to well-known threats and
vulnerabilities, in particular identity and encryption
concerns, leading primarily to organizational risk (e.g.
site defacing), personal information loss, and potential
malware/virus infection from an organization to a
consumer s computer.
Administrative software can process and store significant
volumes of personal information for employees and
patients, which can be subject to personal information
loss, data integrity issues (such as deletion, addition, or
change of critical patient information) resulting in
incorrect patient treatment. Ransomware and other data
availability attacks could cause patient data to be
unavailable during critical treatments.
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Table 3: Cybersecurity Dormains

Cybersecurity
Domain

Quality Management Example

Organizational
Responsibility
Risk Governance

Designate and document a management-level individual responsible for
cybersecurity; implement policies and procedures; train employees.
Review, document and record risk decisions when non-compliant with internal
policies and procedures.
Document and use processes for determining when encryption will be used and
acceptable methods, protocols, and key management approaches.
Document and use processes for determining specific identity and access
technology selections appropriate to technology (e.g. biometric scanning, twofactor authentication).
Document and use process for designing architectures and systems securely and
taking into account privacy principles; develop a repository of technologyspecific requirements for enterprise technologies used.
Document and use a process for gathering threat intel to anticipate potential
vulnerabilities or data exposure. Document a process for identifying
vul nerabi Iities and appropriate remediation ti meframes.
Implement an asset management system and include information about
technologies used internally, implemented in systems or products, third party
status, and configuration information.
Document and use third parties providing equipment, infrastructure, or services.
Routinely assess third parties are following organization processes and
procedures and ensure compliance through standard contractual provisions.
Document and use processes and technologies for ensuring data and device
function integrity, such as file integrity monitoring or similar technologies.
Document test and use routine processes and procedures for detecting potential
incidents, such as intrusion prevention or detection systems, internal forensic
procedures, information sharing models, playbooks and processes, incident
response team and draft notification language.
Document and implement secure network technologies and include appropriate
use of firewalls, firewall management systems, DMZ, data loss prevention tools,
and network segmentation.
Document test and use processes for determining system priority and expected
uptime/downtime requirements. Document, test, and use processes for managing
disaster situations, including appropriate recovery procedures, emergency
operation, and storage of disaster recovery plans.
Document test and use appropriate retention requirements according to data
stored; archive and delete data securely. Ensure ability to ensure data can be
deleted in all systems as appropriate.

Encryption
Identity and
Access
Management
Secure
Development
Program
Threat and
Vulnerability
Management
Asset
Management
Third Party
Management
Integrity
Monitoring
Incident
Response and
Data Breach
Notification
Network
Management
Business
Continuity and
Disaster
Recovery
Retention,
Archive, Deletion
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